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Industrial Land Price and its Impact on Urban Growth: a China study 
 
Abstract:  
 China is experiencing rapid progress in industrialization, with its own rationale towards 
industrial land development based on a deliberate change from an extensive to intensive form 
of urban land use. One result has been concerted attempts by local government to attract foreign 
investment by a low industrial land price strategy, which has resulted in a disproportionally 
large amount of industrial land within the total urban land use structure at the expense of the 
urban sprawl of many cities. This paper first examines “Comparable Benchmark Price as 
Residential land use” (CBPR) as the theoretical basis of the low industrial land price 
phenomenon. Empirical findings are presented from a case study based on data from Jinyun 
County, China. These data are analyzed to reveal the rationale of industrial land price from 
2000 to 2010 concerning the CBPR model. We then explore the causes of low industrial land 
prices in the form of a “Centipede Game Model”, involving two neighborhood regions as 
“major players” to make a set of moves (or strategies). When one of the players unilaterally 
reduces the land price to attract investment with the aim to maximize profits arising from the 
revenues generated from foreign investment and land premiums, a two-player price war begins 
in the form of a dynamic game, the effect of which is to produce a downward spiral of prices. In 
this context, the paradox of maximizing profits for each of the two players are not accomplished 
due to the inter-regional competition of attracted investment leading to a lose-lose situation for 
both sides’ in competing for land premium revenues. A short-term solution to the problem is 
offered involving the establishment of inter-regional cooperative partnerships. For the longer 
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term, however, a comprehensive reform of the local financial system, more adroit regional 
planning and an improved means of evaluating government performance is needed to ensure 
the government’s role in securing pubic goods is not abandoned in favor of one solely 
concerned with revenue generation. 
 
Keywords: Land use, industrial land price, urban growth, Centipede Game Model, China. 
 
1 Introduction 
 Since the 1990s, China has gradually established and improved its socialist market 
economy, boosting its progress in industrialization and urbanization. As a result, a large number 
of urban construction and industrial parks have taken the place of what was formerly cultivated 
land, increasing China’s grain supply security risks and reliance on imported food products. At 
the same time, international food reserves have fallen to their lowest levels in history, raising 
questions over the ability of the international grain market to meet future Chinese food deficits. 
 This situation was recognized as long ago as 1995 in the World Watch Institute’s report 
Who will feed China? (Brown, 1995), alerting the Chinese nation to the importance of 
protecting their cultivated land (Wu et al., 2002). Subsequently, in 1997, the CPC Central 
Committee and State Council issued its To further strengthening land management to protect 
arable land effectively, authorizing the establishment of a comprehensive inventory of all types 
of construction land in existence since 1991. This was followed in 1998 by modifications to The 
Land Administration Law of People’s Republic of China, which provided land use control and 
strictly limited the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural land. These policies 
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should have deterred the replacement of agricultural land by construction land. However, 
according to the 2003 national industrial park inventory, the number of industrial parks was 
5658 with a planning area of 36,000 km2, which exceeds the total China urban construction land 
area at that time (Chen, 2004). It is clear, therefore, that the problems of industrial-agricultural 
land imbalance as well as the extensive industrial land use are far from resolved as yet (Hong, 
2007). 
 Land prices are closely related to urban growth, particularly in China, which acts as a 
‘world factory’ and requires much industrial land (Zhang, 2006). Industrial land prices are 
therefore considered the decisive driving force behind urban growth. According to the classic 
mono-centric theory of urban economics, employment centers are usually situated in the city 
center (CBD). By using different types of land bid-rent curve analyses, the urban spatial 
structure model (O’Sullivan, 2000) was established (as shown in Fig. 1). Clearly, different 
forms of bid-rent curves (for commercial land, residential land, industrial land, etc.) affect 
urban spatial structure and city size. Assuming the bid-rent curves for commercial land and 
residential land remain unchanged, it is obvious that changes in the slope of the industrial land 
bid-rent curve will have a significant impact. When the prices of industrial land tracts are 
relatively high, the slope of the bid-rent curve is greater and the spatial distribution of industrial 
land is located between commercial and residential sites. At the same time, the land structure 
within the city boundary is determined by the slope of bid-rent curve of residential land (Fig. 
1a). On the other hand, when industrial land prices are relatively low, the bid-rent curve slope is 
flat and the spatial distribution of industrial land is located outside of residential sites. In this 
case, the land structure within the city boundary is determined by the slope of the bid-rent curve 
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of industrial land (Fig. 1b). That is to say, theoretically, low industrial land prices (Fig.1b) 
would be the cause of the phenomenon of urban sprawl in China. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 Therefore, two basic hypotheses are proposed in this paper: (1) the policy of low industrial 
land prices lead to too great a proportion of industrial land within the overall urban land use 
structure, which therefore indicates that the ever-increasing amount of industrial land is an 
important driving force behind China’s urban growth; and (2) the cause of low industrial land 
prices is the intensity of inter-regional competition in attempting to attract foreign investment, 
resulting in the urban sprawl of many cities, as shown in Fig. 1b. 
 
2 Industrial land use policy in China 
2.1 Review of industrial land allocation policies 
 Since the founding of the new PRC in 1949, China’s industrial land allocation policies have 
gone through many stages, during which the role of market has varied. 
 
Stage I: 1949-1954, state ownership of industrial land with low fees or rent 
 In the early period, the co-existence of state-owned and private land prevailed. Private land 
could be traded, rented, etc. Later, the government transferred most of urban land to 
stated-owned land, typically by administrative take-over, confiscation, redemption and legal 
announcement. The state ownership of land was therefore gradually established. During this 
period, individuals and institutions had to pay rent or fees, controlled and regulated by the 
government, in order to use the land. Government action therefore gradually replaced the 
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market in allocating industrial land at this stage. 
 
Stage II: 1955-1978, government assignment of industrial land use 
 In 1954, the rent and fees for land use were cancelled at the behest of the Financial 
Secretary and Department of Interior. Payments from individuals and institutions were no 
longer needed, lands for construction were allocated according to the overall land resource plan, 
and no land beyond these plans could be used. As a result, the land no longer constituted 
merchandise and the land market disappeared. 
 
Stage III: 1979-1991, co-existence of government assigned and paid use of industrial land 
 Since 1979, with the reform of rural land use, farmers possessed title to long-term use 
rights though the land remained collectively owned. This greatly stimulated China’s 
agricultural productivity. At the same time, with the continuous development of township 
enterprises, the economy started to boom, which prompted urban industrial land use 
management into a reform agenda in the 1980s. In 1987, for the first time, land in the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone was transferred through grant by negotiation and auction (Zhu, 1994). 
In the same year, with the State Council’s proposal for the transferability of land use rights in 
the free market, pilot reform tests were further conducted at Fuzhou, Haikou, Guangzhou, 
Xiamen, Shanghai and Tianjin. 
 
Stage IV: 1992-now, exploration development of industrial land  
 In 1992, the establishment of a socialist market economy status by the central government 
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was formally determined. Urban construction in China, particularly that in industrial parks, 
mushroomed in various places. In order to curb the momentum of cultivated/agricultural land 
occupied by rapid urbanization and industrialization the Land Management Law was amended 
in 1998 in order to establish improved land use control.  
 
2.2 Policy for industrial parks 
 In 2001, the industrial land use right transfer was introduced to terminate the 
non-competitive Agreement-based assignment of the right to state-owned land use in favor of 
the competitive tender, bid and auction approach to state-owned land use (the so-called “zhao 
pai gua”). Since 2006, the Ministry of Land and Resources has issued its Minimum price 
standards for the transfer of land for industrial use and Industrial land control targets. This led 
to China’s “world factory” role, with the dramatically expanding development of its large-sized 
industrial parks. In Zhejiang Province, for example, the number of estimated planning 
development zones reached 754 in 2005 while the actual number of development zones 
approved was only 80. 
 The planning areas of industrial parks in Zhejiang Province’s 11 prefecture-level cities are 
summarized in Table 1. As shown, the total area of the parks is around 1067 hectares, in 
contrast with a total central urban built-up area of only 1262 hectares. Likewise, for the 
individual urban centers of Ningbo, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Jinhua and Taizhou City, the total area of 
industrial parks exceeds that of total urban built-up area. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
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3 Industrial land use and urban growth management: key literature 
 The two major issues regarding industry development and the impact on industrial land 
concern employment and pollution. This is reflected in the two major topics - “Location” and 
“Zoning” - found largely in the early literature (Weber and Friedrich, 1929; Alonso, 1964; 
Miller and de Roo, 1997). There, an obvious difference in research focus is apparent between 
developing and developed countries. With developed countries, the research is not focused on 
increased industrial land, but on sustainable development. As Ziegler (2009) points out, a 
metropolitan sustainable development governing framework for growth management in the 
twenty-first century is essential for a sustainable future. 
 A particularly important recent Western study by Liu et al (2007) couples human and 
natural systems to reveal new and complex patterns and processes. Their synthesis of six case 
studies from around the world shows that such couplings vary across space, time, and 
organizational units. The nonlinear dynamics involved, with thresholds, reciprocal feedback 
loops, time lags, resilience, heterogeneity and surprises are also demonstrated, with couplings 
having legacy effects on present conditions and future possibilities. In Ziegler’s (2009) case, 
this includes both the provision of higher-density urban centers and transit-oriented 
development centers, and a change in public attitude away from “not in my back yard” thinking. 
Using 1998 to 2003 panel data from 406 Florida cities, Lubell et al (2009) conducted an 
empirical analysis to identify important interaction effects between the structure of city 
executive branch institutions and interest group variables. Institutional structure helps 
determine which interest groups’ preferences are reflected in local land-use changes and 
development patterns. The resulting patterns suggest a “sustainability paradox”, in which richer, 
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environmental interests pursue the preservation of environmental amenities while at the same 
time accelerating the number of residential units built in a community.  
 With developing countries, the research focus emphasizes urban growth management in 
the process of urbanization in addition to industrialization. Some scholars apply the concept of 
‘urban growth boundaries (UGB)’, already in use in the early period of developed countries, to 
urban growth research in developing countries. UGB is a regulatory measure used by local 
government for delineating the limits of urban growth over a period of time. Land within the 
UGB allows urban development, while the land outside remains primarily non-urban. Recently, 
UGB management rules have been extensively applied in the urban land-use management 
discipline in developing countries. For example, Bhattaa (2009) introduced the concept model 
‘ideal urban radial proximity’ (IURP), involving the increasing popularity, urban vegetation, 
water bodies and other important non-urban areas within the inner city space to designate a 
spatial UGB using geo-informatics in a digital environment. This conceptual model has been 
applied in the Kolkata urban agglomeration in India. In China, Feng et al. (2010) put forward 
the concept of Urban Construction Boundary (UCB). Three indicators on boundary control 
were proposed, including the effectiveness of boundary containment, land inventory 
sufficiency and illegal adjacent development to the UCB. It is found that the effectiveness of 
urban construction boundary containment is not good and it is not binding well. There is still 
much room for improvement in the future. Bae and Sellers (2007), on the other hand, explore 
the politics of urban growth in a transitional society in Korea. Here, a multilevel analysis 
approach is established to show that the transformations in Korea as a late industrializer, late 
democratizer and late adopter of urban policy have helped to consolidate more restricted 
 9 
policies on urban growth than in the USA and much of Europe. The research findings further 
highlight the dynamics involved at global, national and local levels to explain the similarities 
and differences in the growth politics of a transitional society such as Korea with those of older 
industrialized democracies. Similarly, Zhao et al (2009) investigated the 
decentralized-concentration strategy, one of the most important metropolitan growth 
management initiatives in Beijing since the 1990s, to better understand the effectiveness of 
growth management in a transformational context. The results suggest that the aims of 
municipal growth management to concentrate developments in the urban fringe have been 
partly achieved through actual local development; while some unexpected and illegal local 
developments outside the planned areas have been counterproductive. The performance of 
present growth management is also being challenged by new trends in political decentralization 
and changed local fiscal responsibilities. 
 With the rapid process of urbanization and industrialization, there have been many studies 
of industrial land use in China, with the intensive use of industrial land becoming a major focus. 
For example, Wu (2007) considers the critical determinants of extensive land use to be the very 
low industrial land use prices occurring because of intense competition among regions to attract 
foreign investment.  Lu et al (2006) argue that industrial land is the main driving force behind 
urban land expansion and, as a result, controlling and guiding increased industrial land use is 
the key to achieving its sustainability. Along these lines, Jia et al (2010) holds that it is 
necessary for China to adopt industrial land planning, standards, preliminary review as well as 
monitoring overall industrial land intensive use. In addition, an analysis of industrial land use in 
Ningbo indicates the local economic development level to be an important factor affecting the 
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intensive use of industrial land (Li et al., 2008). Gu et al (2009) believe that selecting different 
industries for different areas will help promote overall intensive land use planning. 
 In comparison with the literature relating to developing countries, studies of industrial land 
use in most of developed countries focus on the risks in industrial land redevelopment, such as 
those involved in the development and utilization of brownfield land (Sigman, 2010; Adams et 
al, 2010). Zhu (2000) points out that industrial land use policy often changes due to industrial 
economic development needs followed by rapid global economic development. Meanwhile, 
Wong and Tang (2005) indicate that a great deal of vacant land is found in the Economic and 
Technological Development Zone of China due to ‘development zone fever’, which has 
resulted in both the waste of valuable land resources’ and inefficient land use.  
 In short, most studies have been of industrial land use in addition to urban growth 
management from the perspective of planning, while very little systematic research has been 
conducted in terms of the combination of market and planning strategies. This paper, therefore, 
aims to explicate the driving forces as well as causes behind the burgeoning industrial land in 
China from the perspective of land transfer prices, as a contribution to the regulation of urban 
growth in developing countries in general. The data is collected from the local land transfer 
database in a county region of Zhejiang Province. 
 
4 The Case of Jinyun County 
 Jinyan is a Chinese county - an administrative unit of very important historical and realistic 
significance in China as reflected in the mantra Junxian zhi, Tianxia an (If the counties are well 
managed, the whole country will be peaceful and prosperous).  In China’s administrative 
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structure, counties are ranked below prefecture-level cities, with each prefecture-level city 
having jurisdiction over a number of counties. A county with a larger population or economic 
scale is termed a ‘county-level city’. For example, Shenzhen is ranked as “a prefecture-level 
city”, while Yiwu (renowned for its small commodity trading) is classified as “county-level 
city”. There are a total of 285 prefecture-level cities, 368 county-level cities and 1570 counties 
(MCA, 2012). The extreme importance of the role that the county unit plays in the national 
power structure and development strategy has provided it with independent rights in 
administration, judicial, financial and other sectors, and the exercise of land use right transfers 
(Chen et al., 2006).  
 In this paper, industrial land use prices at the County level are analyzed to understand the 
relationship between the selling prices and proportion of urban land involved, and to interpret 
the effects of increased amounts of industrial land on urban growth. A dynamic game theory 
approach is then used to further assess the influence of low industrial land prices on regional 
industry development. Fig. 2 illustrates what is involved. 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
4.1 Case area 
 The district analyzed in this study, Jinyun County in Zhejiang Province, is a typical County 
unit in China. It is located in Lishui City, covering an area of 1495 km2 and with a population of 
453,404 in 2010 (Fig. 3). At distance of 300km from Shanghai, Jinyun County is a ‘relatively 
developing region’ in the south of Zhejiang Province. The year 2002 marked the opening of the 
highway from Jinyun County to Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province – greatly 
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improving access to the County. According to the sixth Census data in China, the population of 
Jinyun County is 358,900. It is ranked 18th of the 36 administrative counties in Zhejiang 
Province, which makes it very representative of China’s coastal regions. In 2010, the overall 
GDP of Jinyun was RMB$10.78 billion, with the proportion of three major industrial sectors 
(agriculture, industry, and services) being “6:60:34” respectively.  
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
 
4.2 Comparative analysis of industrial land prices and residential land prices 
 As early as the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (2001-2005), Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the 
Chinese State Council, announced its intention to move the country’s economic growth from an 
extensive to intensive mode although, as yet, the extensive mode of growth still dominates 
(Wen, 2005). In terms of land use, the supply of industrial land use is particularly acute (Hong, 
2007). As the most critical determinant of industrial land use availability are very low industrial 
land transfer prices, the Ministry of Land and Resources issued its Minimum price standards for 
the transfer of land for industrial use, followed by various local implementation rules in 
different provinces. As is shown by local survey data, however, the very low industrial land 
prices have prevented the desired fundamental change of urban growth from extensive use to 
intensive use. During the period 2000-2010, 364 tracts of industrial land with a mean value of 
123 yuan/m2 (106 yuan/m2, 634 yuan/m2 and 25 yuan/m2 for the median, highest and lowest 
prices respectively), were transferred by bid and agreement (Fig. 4).  
 <Insert Figure 4 here> 
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However, industrial land prices were relatively lower than the sale prices of residential land 
during the same period, with the average bid price of residential land during 2000 to 2010 being 
3816 yuan/m2 - increasing after 2007 to 4865 yuan/m2. 
 As the policies for industrial land use and residential land use are different, equivalent 
values need to be established in line with the relevant parameters of Industrial land control 
targets. On one hand, the regulations require that the proportion of the land area of 
administrative office and living facilities cannot exceed 7% of the overall amount of project 
land In fact, the administrative office and living facilities can be used as residential houses for 
workers, and so the land area involved is equivalent to residential land. On the other hand, the 
maximum term of residential land use is 70 years and that of industrial land use is 50 years. 
According to current rates, the interest rate of bank loans with a maturity of 5 years is 5.94%, 
while the conversion ratio of industrial land to residential land is 0.9620. This is calculated by 
the Capitalized approach on condition that the term of 70 years is equivalent to 98.3% of the 
indefinite and the term of 50 years is equivalent to 94.6% of the indefinite. To sum up, the 
comparison of benchmark relations on characteristics and conversion price between industrial 
and residential land is shown in Table 2.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 In line with Table 2, a theoretical model named the “Comparable benchmark price as 
residential land use” (CBPR) was therefore established for use as a method of converting 
industrial land prices to residential land prices in Jinyun from 2000 to 2010, where 
 CBPR= IP / RALO / CRIR 
      =123/7%/0.9620 
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      =1826 (Yuan/m2) 
where IP denotes the “Industrial land transfer price”, RALO the “the ratio of land area of 
administrative office and living facilities to the overall land area” and CRIR the “conversion 
ratio of industrial land to residential land”. 
 In this study, the CBPR is a type of shadow price model. In the model, the total industrial 
land transfer fee is completely projected onto land for the administrative office and living 
facilities (7% of overall industrial project land) in order to gain the CBPR. In fact, the CBPR is 
comparable with the residential land transfer price, so that the land area of administrative 
offices and living facilities can be used as residential houses for the workers, which is 
equivalent to residential land area. The comparative price of residential housing in Jinyun 
County is 1826 yuan/m2, which is only 48% of the average price of open lease-out residential 
land at 3816 yuan/m2 (Table 2). As the function of land area for administrative office and living 
facilities is similar to that for residential houses in suburban areas, the enterprises can obtain the 
land compensation fee providing 93% of the land is idle. Briefly, if 7% of the industrial land can 
be used as residential project development, it is inevitable for enterprises to acquire industrial 
land (not for sale), by which to develop the disguised form of residential project development 
(for sale). Similarly, the comparable residential price in Jinyun after 2007 was 
177/7%/0.962=2629, which is 54% of the average price of residential land at 4865 yuan / m2 
(see Table 3).  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
 According to the rule of substitutability between land and capital, rational enterprises 
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choose a combination of factor proportions including largest land area and minimal funds when 
industrial land price is very low, and which will therefore lead to extensive land use. In this way, 
low industrial land prices produce a potential price advantage induced by the search for change 
of land use type, and which eventually leads to the loss of state assets. With the establishment of 
a low price policy of industrial land from 2000 to 2010, the industrial and warehousing land 
accounts for a significantly higher proportion of new built-up land of 864 hectares in Jinyun. 
The new urban built-up land can be divided into four types, comprising public administration 
and infrastructure services land, industrial and warehousing land, residential land and 
commercial land. According to the 2000-2010 statistics, the amount of new urban land for the 
four types is 257.38, 480.81, 112.65 and 13.07 hectares respectively, with industrial and 
warehousing land space accounting for 55.65% of the total (Fig. 5).  
 <Insert Figure 5 here> 
 
 Corresponding with Jinyun’s 2001-2020 comprehensive urban planning, industrial and 
warehousing land is 49.9 hectares, accounting for 13.1% of the total urban land use area. 
According to the original comprehensive urban planning of Jinyun, new industrial and 
warehousing land area was intended to be 93.0 hectares, or 16.9% of the total urban land use 
area of 142.9 hectare. In practice, however, new industrial and warehousing land area increased 
to 480.81 hectares, accounting for 55.65% of total new construction land. Obviously, the 
original comprehensive urban planning was not well implemented, resulting in the proportion 
of industrial land area being too large and therefore preventing the intended change from 
extensive land use to intensive land use.  
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 As shown above, the proportion of industrial and warehousing land is too high which is 
resulted by the relatively low industrial price (Fig. 5). The ever-increasing industrial land has 
therefore become the key driving force behind China’s rapid urban growth. This phenomenon is 
echoed with the Hypothesis (1) in this study. The overwhelming proportion of industrial land in 
urban areas, that has occurred as a result of the low industrial land price policy, has made 
industrial land development the major driving force of urban growth in China. 
 
5 Centipede game model: causes of low industrial land prices   
 In China, there is often a lack of capital for local government to promote economic growth 
(e.g., to develop industrial parks) (Xu et al., 2009). If a low industrial land price policy is 
conducive to attracting investment, then the government’s behavior and policy is clearly 
rational. As is well known, urban development (and the development of industrial parks in 
particular) can produce beneficial effects on the accumulation of production factors to realize 
the economies of scale.  
 In the short term, the development of industrial land meets both government GDP targets 
and the employment needs of the population; while in the long-term, industrial development 
can provide a guarantee for future local fiscal revenue. Lishui City, as one of the relatively 
backward areas in Zhejiang Province, has been seeking the synchronization of modernization 
with the overall development of the province since entering the new millennium. Jinyun’s 
strategy of Using industry to make county powerful echoes the spirit of regional planning in 
Lishui City. 
 Although the low industrial land premium policy is aimed at attracting investment in China, 
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it actually results in a policy game played between regions. The results from the game theory 
analysis between regions not only affect the land use mode (whether it is intensive or extensive) 
but their attraction of foreign investment (see Table 4).  When the total investment is fixed and 
other factors affecting investment remain the same, the land premium often becomes the 
determining factor in attracting investment. Suppose we need to decide whether to invest in 
regions L or J when they choose to adopt the normal land premium policy (J1 and L1 in Table 4), 
not only is land use intensified but the investment attractions from both sides remain 
unaffected.With a fixed total investment, investment attraction becomes a zero-sum game. 
Therefore, if region L adopts a low-premium policy, it will attract more investment with region 
J attracting less investment. If, to correct the situation, region J also adopts a low-premium 
policy, both the investment attractions are affected with extensive land use mode (see Table 4).  
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
 The GDP per capita in Jinyun has risen from $700 in 2001 to $3500 in 2010. In 
correspondence with the Hollis Chenery’s patterns of development approach (Chenery, 1968), 
urban development at the expense of rural development can lead to a substantial loss of equality 
between internal regions of a country. Similar to experiences in North European Countries, 
Jinyun is currently undergoing a transition period from early to midterm industrialization, 
which makes it consistent in terms of overall growth in industrial land and economic 
development. The situation in Jinyun is also closely related to China’s participation in the 
international division of labor since it entered the WTO in 2000. The significant influence of 
 18 
Made in China in the global context has also spawned a large number of industrial land areas. 
Similarly, a large-scale increase in industrial land is quite common in developed coastal areas 
and other parts of China. For example, land expropriation in the Heilongjiang Province in 2010 
resulted in 48% of land earmarked for use in future industrial development. 
 There is a precedent for low industrial land prices in the initial stages of industrial 
development. For example, industrial park development policies were implemented in Hong 
Kong in 1977. Land prices in the 1980s within the industrial park were lowered to HK 
$ 1000/m2 while the land price in the open public market at the same period was around HK 
$ 4000-8000/m2 (Lao and Cai, 1992). This low industrial land price policy encouraged many 
manufacturers that were originally located in urban industrial buildings to relocate to more rural 
areas, thereby reducing the industries’ negative impact on the urban environment. In this way, 
some well-known high-tech manufacturers were also attracted to Hong Kong. In contrast, 
although most of the regions in mainland China implemented a low industrial land price policy 
with the intention of attracting investment, it did not yield good results. The reasons for this 
have not been established although dynamic game theory offers some apparent insights. 
 One approach is to invoke Centipede Game Theory. This exists in many different versions 
(Aumann, 1998; Sperry-Taylor, 2011). The earliest, put forward by Rosenthal (1981), was 
tailored for chain store pricing decisions under complete information. This is an extensive game 
form in which two players take turns choosing to take either a slightly larger share of a slowly 
increasing pot, or to pass the pot to the other player. This was later represented by a “Centipede 
Model” by Binmore (1987) involving two relevant parties in which players demonstrate a 
dynamic chess game.  
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 In terms of the industrial land price issue, we assume that, if the loss incurred in reducing 
industrial land prices by local government is less than the investment income obtained, a 
price-cutting spiral occurs between regions. Now, assume the two regions each obtain '100' 
original revenue from land sales and the revenue generated after the attracting investment is 
also ‘100’ each. Suppose the total amount of investment remains unchanged while the amount 
of attracted investment can be divided into several parts. For example, if there is 1% reduction 
in land price in the ‘L’ region, there might be a concomitant 2% increase in the normal premium 
returning to the revenues of the ‘J’ region. This process is demonstrated and depicted in Fig. 6.  
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
 
 This depicts the decision making process between the two sides (the L side is above the 
centerline, while the J side is below the centerline) and can be explained in term of a series of 
steps: 
Step 1: Say the decision of ‘L’ is intended to be a “no trick” strategy. This means the two 
parties both take normal industrial land prices and are awarded with their individual revenues of 
attracted investment. The total amount of revenue is therefore 200 (100 land revenue and 100 
investment revenue).   
Step 2: When the J side is informed of the decision made by the L side, the J side proceeds 
to Step 2. In this case, the land price falls by 1%, resulting in an 2% increase in investment 
earnings so that the land price becomes 99, investment revenue 102, and total revenue 201 
(which is better than the 200 in Step 1). Following the assumption made earlier, the total 
amount of investment remains unchanged. The increased foreign investment revenues are from 
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the ‘L’ side, which results in lower total income of 198 on the ‘L’ side. 
Step 3: The ‘L’ side is also individually rational, so it decides to reduce its land prices by 
2%, 1% more than the ‘J’ side, to 98. The investment earnings from ‘L’ then become ‘102’ and 
the total income ‘200’ (which is better than L’s total income of 198 in Step 2). At the same time, 
the total income of the ‘J’ side reduces to ‘197’.  
Step 4: In response,the ‘J’ side changes its strategy again by making a 3% reduction in land 
prices, which is 1% greater than the ‘L’ side. Investment earnings from ‘J’ are now ‘102’ and the 
total income is ‘199’ (which is better than J’s total income of 197 in Step 3). At the same time, 
the total income of the ‘L’ side becomes ‘196’. 
…… 
Step 101: By this time, the ‘L’ side lowers its land price to ‘0’, which is 1% more than the 
‘J’ side. The investment earnings from ‘L’ now become ‘102’ with total income ‘102’ (which is 
better than L’s total income of 101 in Step 100). At the same time, the investment earnings and 
total income of ‘J’ are ‘98’ and ‘99’ respectively. 
 Obviously, if there is no minimum limit to industrial land prices, the game eventually stays 
at Step 101 since this is the point of the zero limit of the land price. With minimum price policy 
restrictions, for example, a minimum transfer land price of 50% of the market price, the 
dynamic game theory process will stay at Step 51. In fact, as Fig. 6 implies, there are no 
fundamental changes in investment attractions in the regions ‘J’ and ‘L’. In this way, therefore, 
a loss of land prices in both of the regions has occurred. 
 From a practical point of view, it should be noted that the Chinese government has 
identified the harm done by low industrial land prices, and the State Council issued an industrial 
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land market-oriented policy in 2006 mandating the land bidding/auctions mode. However, the 
policy has not fundamentally solved the low industrial land price problem to date. The 
industrial land prices from 2000 to 2010 in Jinyun have not reflected market competition (Fig. 7) 
as they continued to be 100-150 yuan/m2 from 2000 to 2007. Since 2007, land prices have 
actually accelerated as a result of the minimum industrial land price policy change.  
<Insert Figure 7 here> 
 
 The industrial land prices during the 2007-2010 period further suggest that the influence of 
market competition has dropped despite the increase in the minimum land price, with land 
prices generally ranging between 160-180 yuan/m2 (Fig. 8). In addition, it has been 
demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that share price changes driven by market 
factors tend to follow a normal probability distribution (Praetz, 1972). However, as Fig. 8 
shows, the distributional shape of Jinyun’s industrial land price changes is far from that of a 
normal probability distribution, suggesting that changes in industrial land transfer are not 
driven by free market factors but by local government actions in endeavoring to attract 
investment.    
 <Insert Figure 8 here> 
 Theoretically speaking, the price of land-use depends on land-use type, location, land-use 
density, and neighborhood externalities (Ding, 2003). Location plays a key role in determining 
the land price providing the land use types are same (e.g., all are industrial land). However, the 
above-mentioned phenomenon is not reflected in Fig. 8, where industrial land prices appear to 
be mostly similar irrespective of their location. Instead, the slope of the industrial land bidding 
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curve in Fig.1b other than Fig.1a, indicates that the urban boundary is determined by the 
expansion of industrial land. The Land bidding/auctions mode of industrial land transfer does 
not promote the formation of a land market and no fundamental approach seems to be available 
to solve the problems of low industrial land prices. The industrial land prices appear to be 
concentrated within the range of 160-180 yuan/m2, which reflects the phenomenon of the low 
industrial land price policy mandated by local government (Fig. 8). As Wu (2007) suggests, this 
may be due to the intensity of inter-regional competition in attempting to attract foreign 
investment. 
 The direct competitor of Jinyun is the Liandou district – the only political city center 
nearby – with Jinyun County and Liandou both being on the railway and highway to Shanghai 
and Hangzhou. After the tax system reforms in 1994, the central government’s fiscal revenue 
has kept increasing year by year, although the local government’s fiscal revenue has reduced in 
recent years (Jia and Yan, 2005). In order to resolve the shortage of funds resulting from the 
process of industrialization, the Liandou government has adopted a strategy of attracting 
foreign investment through low industrial land prices and hence helping to maintain similarly 
low prices of its regional neighbors. 
 The mean of industrial land price in Lishui is 159 yuan/m2, while that of Jinyun County is 
177 yuan/m2, which is similar to the Liandou District, higher than other counties and lower than 
the Qingtian County (229 yuan/m2). This is caused largely by the behavior of the various parties 
involved and forces all to maintain low limit transfer land price levels. In fact, examining the 
relationships involved in industrial land transfers in game terms need be not only limited to the 
Lishui City in Zhejiang Province, but also competition in the Yangtze River Delta region, and 
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even China and Southeast Asia as a whole. 
 Overall, it can be concluded from the Centipede Game Model as well as the evidence from 
Jinyun case that the causes of low industrial land price are the intensity of inter-regional 
competition to attract foreign investment. In this context, as shown in Fig.1b, the slope of the 
industrial land rent-bidding curve will become flattened significantly, which leads to the urban 
sprawl phenomenon seen in many cities of China and the evidence from the Centipede Game 
Model is echoed with Hypothesis 2. In other words, the low land premium policy under the 
background of regional investment competition has interfered with the land leasing market, 
which influences the urban spatial structure, leading to the phenomenon of outside industrial 
land unfolding in the form of the expression “urban space structure expands like standing 
pancake” . 
 
6 Discussion 
 
The role that the industrial land premium has played in China’s urban expansion is 
inseparable from China’s position as the “World factory”. Though county-level government in 
China is politically centralized, inter-county competition is very intensive. For example, the 
construction of industrial parks is not only pegged to the county’s financial system but also acts 
as a critical factor in the performance evaluation of local officials. Therefore, there should be 
reasonable inter-regional planning guidance to achieve inter-regional “win-win” development 
in the future.  
 Local financial system 
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The strategy by local government to adopt a low industrial land transfer price is determined 
to some extent by local financial considerations. A significant local government source of 
income is through Value-added Tax (VAT), accounting for approximately 60% of overall tax 
revenue (Bai, 2010). Therefore, it is in the local government’s fund-raising interest to attract as 
much foreign investment as possible for building factories in order to secure the associated VAT 
returns. This has in fact become the root cause of the current so-called low-level redundant 
construction throughout China (Wang, 2004). In contrast, the main sources of government 
revenue in many developed countries are property taxes. For example, local government 
property taxes in the USA in 1975 accounted for 51.2% of total tax revenue (Barlowe, 1978). 
This is due to property tax being transparent and stable - providing a steady stream of revenue 
for local governments (Youngman and Malme, 2004).  
 Since the beginning of 2011, China has been trialing property taxes in Shanghai, the largest 
city by population in the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2011).  
To date, however, the property tax is being used mainly to curb the rapid increase of housing 
prices in these locations (Han et al, 2011). In view of what has been written above, it would 
seem that China would benefit more in future from a property tax levy to provide a stable source 
of finance for local governments. In addition, such a move could also provide some social 
equity concerning resource consumption and enable the city to provide infrastructure and 
production space as well as living space, obviating the current overreliance on foreign 
investment in industrial park building. 
 Local government performance evaluation 
 Since Deng Xiaoping’s Development is the absolute principle theme, a number of local 
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governments now pay most of their attention to revenue generation at the expense of the local 
ecological environment (Managia and Kanekob, 2009).  In particular, the accelerated 
development of industrial parks has resulted in a weakening of pollution control in these areas, 
leading to serious environmental degradation. For example, Qiantang River, the largest in 
Zhejiang Province, plays a critical role in water supply, electricity generation, irrigation, 
tourism, fishery and shipping in the Qiantang River basin. As is acknowledged by Su et al 
(2011), the Qiantang River basin is one of the most rapidly advanced economic regions in 
China, and is now known as ‘the world’s workshop’.  However, it is widely acknowledged that 
the water quality of the Qiantang River continues to deteriorate, mainly due to industrial 
wastewater pollution (Huang et al, 2010). Compared with the previous year, the changes 
Zhejiang province’s industrial wastewater yearly discharge rates in the period of 2006-2010 are 
‘+3.74%’, ‘+0.50%’, ‘-7.58%’,’+1.45%’, and ‘+6.88%’ respectively (Zhejiang Environmental 
Protection Office, 2011). Therefore, it is obvious that, with the exception of the decreased rate 
of ‘7.58%’ in 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) affecting industrial production and 
causing a fall in the production of industrial wastewater emissions, the rate of industrial 
wastewater discharge is generally increasing. In addition to water pollution, air quality and 
heavy metal soil pollution are also very serious issues, creating a potential health hazard for 
many local residents (Chan and Yao, 2008; Li et al, 2009). A change is therefore needed from 
the current GDP based revenue focus of local government to one that places greater emphasis 
on people’s livelihood and environmental protection. 
 Regional planning 
 By using the “centipede game model” in Jinyun County, the economic theory of “fallacy of 
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composition” was illustrated. That is, although the individual (non-cooperative) strategy of 
each local government is locally rational, the intensity of competition is such that the combined 
effect of all the local governments involved is non-rational. One approach to overcoming this is 
to establish cooperative relationships between the regions to reduce the intensity of the 
competition. In an attempt to do this, the State Council have adopted a Development Priority 
Zoning (DPZ) strategy and which, bearing in mind the importance of the region, may have a 
significant impact on the regional land use in China (Wu et al, 2011). 
 The overall industry production in China is characterized by the “excess production 
capacity” of very similar types of industries. Possibilities for diversification exist, however, that 
may offer increased benefits in addition to relieving some of the current intense competition. 
For example, by matching industry development plans more to the economic conditions of the 
Counties. Taking Lishui city as an example, the Liandou district, Jinyun County and Qingtian 
County, being more economically developed, make it more rational to develop an ecological 
industry (such as tourism) in other mountainous counties in line with the DPZ strategy.  In 
short, it may be better for local government to transfer land development rights from those 
mountainous counties to other counties with better locations. In this way, a transfer payment 
system among regions could be established to avoid overly intense competition, improve 
industrial land transfer prices and hence correcting the current land use imbalance hindering 
agricultural facilities and production. 
China’s commitment to a market economy could hardly allow such an arrangement to continue. 
What is needed in the longer term, is a comprehensive reform of the local financial system, 
government performance evaluation, and regional planning. 
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7 Conclusions 
 China is now experiencing a rapidly advancing industrialization stage, with its own 
rationale towards industrial land development based on changing from an extensive to intensive 
form of urban land use. However, attempting to attract foreign investment by a low industrial 
land price strategy at the County level has resulted in a disproportionally large amount of 
industrial land within the total urban land use structure at the expense of land needed for 
agriculture. The main cause of this situation appears to be the intense competition from other 
counties because of their adoption of the same strategy, a phenomenon reproduced by the 
“centipede game model” presented in this paper. As Wu (2007) points out, the vicious 
competition is likely to bring about chaos to China’s industrial layout, reducing the core 
competitiveness of China’s industrial products in the international market in the long run.  
 One possible approach to redressing this situation would be to establish inter-regional 
cooperative partnerships aimed at avoiding future cutthroat competition and price wars. Also, a 
multi-pronged approach from financial institutions and regional planners as well as local 
government performance evaluation measures may ultimately achieve the change from 
extensive to intensive urban land use needed. From a practical industrial land management 
perspective, the former would be a short-term strategy to ensure a reasonable minimum level of 
industrial land transfer prices and therefore indirectly regulate the amount of industrial land 
available. This should have the effect of raising and stabilizing the price of industrial land 
generally in China in future. Meanwhile, however, it is crucial to monitor the industrial land 
premium rationally to control the regional competition between regions, which can further 
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achieve the shift needed from the extensive to intensive land use mode in order to obtain 
sustainable economic growth in China in the long run.  
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